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CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF ABUSED 
PRIVACY RIGHTS:  MODIFYING THIRD-
PARTY FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING 
DOCTRINE POST-SPOKEO 
SARAH E. PUGH* 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) provides various privacy protections for 
electronic communications; however, the statute has failed to keep up with 
technological advances, and the application of third-party Fourth Amendment 
standing doctrine has whittled away privacy protections.  Microsoft is bringing a 
Fourth Amendment challenge to sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA, which—
when used in combination—permit the government to use “no-notice warrants” 
and secrecy orders to access a cloud user’s communications and data from the 
electronic communications provider without the cloud user’s knowledge. 
The greater problem is that these actions may go unchallenged in court.  As 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence currently provides, Fourth 
Amendment rights may not be raised vicariously.  However, where Microsoft’s 
cloud customers are entirely unaware that a search has taken place, they lack 
the knowledge to bring a claim and assert their own rights.  Moreover, there is 
the secondary problem of establishing whether Microsoft’s customers have 
suffered a sufficient harm from this invasion of privacy by the government.  
New case law suggests that the improper sharing of personal information 
might not satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement for standing.  If the Court 
extends this case to the Fourth Amendment and requires evidence that the 
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search had a concrete negative impact, Microsoft’s customers may not have 
suffered a legally cognizable harm. 
This Comment advocates adopting a modified and relaxed third-party 
standing doctrine to permit electronic communications service providers to 
defend their customers’ privacy interests and raise Fourth Amendment claims 
on their behalf where they are unable to do so themselves.  This approach 
would also require the court to expressly identify an improper search and 
seizure of electronic communications and data as a sufficient “injury in fact” 
to confer standing, minimizing the impact of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. 
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“[J]ust as the Internet has opened up the world for each and every one of us, 
it has also opened up each and every one of us to the world.  And increasingly, 
the price we’re being asked to pay for all of this connectedness is our privacy.” 
—Gary Kovacs1 
 
The American people have significantly valued their privacy since 
colonial times, and there has been a continual battle to safeguard this 
privacy.2  During the American Revolutionary War, people were 
                                                     
 1. Tracking Our Online Trackers, TED TALKS (May 2012), https://www.ted.com/ 
talks/gary_kovacs_tracking_the_trackers/transcript?language=en. 
 2. Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON 
PRIVACY, PLI, 1-1, § 1:2, at 1–4 (2006), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcont 
ent.cgi?article=2076&context=faculty_publications (noting that the colonists were 
“afforded unprecedented privacy” in America). 
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concerned about general warrants that often resulted in law 
enforcement ransacking people’s homes and belongings;3 today, privacy 
concerns are still grounded in a fear of excessive government intrusion 
into spaces that the people have generally regarded as private and 
secure.4  Because Americans value individual privacy so highly, Congress 
has passed many laws protecting our privacy and personal information.5 
However, laws seeking to protect privacy have often proven 
inadequate, in keeping pace with significant technological progress.6  
This was true of the 1968 Wiretap Act,7 which was ultimately 
amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(ECPA).8  Now, as technology continues to develop and progress,9 the 
validity of the ECPA is being called into question. 
                                                     
 3. Id. § 1:2, at 1–5 (highlighting the preservation of privacy in the Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments in the Bill of Rights). 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4. See Solove, supra note 2, § 1:4.2, at 1–23 (“The increasing computerization of 
information and the burgeoning repositories of personal data in federal agencies 
continued to be a topic of importance.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Wiretap 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801–804, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)) (establishing rules that the 
government must follow to obtain wiretap orders); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 
No. 91-508, §§ 601–622, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127–36 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t) (promoting the accuracy, fairness, and privacy of information 
contained in the records of consumer reporting agencies); Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 88 Stat. 484, 571–74 (codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g) (granting parents protections regarding information about their 
children’s education records, including report cards, transcripts, disciplinary records, 
and family contact information); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (governing the collection, maintenance, use, 
and dissemination of personal information in federal agency records). 
 6. Russell S. Burnside, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986:  
The Challenge of Applying Ambiguous Statutory Language to Intricate Telecommunication 
Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451, 455 (1987). 
 7. Id. at 462–63 (noting that the Wiretap Act only expressly protected against the 
“unauthorized aural interception of voice communications,” thereby excluding 
developing technologies like email and cell phones from its scope (footnote omitted)). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2521, 2701–2710, 3117, 3121–3126 (2012)). 
 9. See, e.g., Caitlin White, Cloud Computing Timeline Illustrates Cloud’s Past, Predicts 
Its Future, TECHTARGET (DEC. 2013), http://searchcloudcomputing.techtarget.com/feat 
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One such development, the increasing availability of cloud storage 
solutions, has revolutionized Internet usage.10  Prior to 1986, when the 
ECPA was first enacted, very few people outside of the business 
community had access to the Internet.11  Individuals and businesses used 
to maintain physical control over their records by storing documents in 
filing cabinets or on local hard drives or servers.  As personal use of the 
Internet increased, questions about the adequacy of privacy standards 
arose, leading to the privacy protections and law enforcement access 
standards provided for in the ECPA.12  Today, nearly everyone uses the 
Internet on a daily basis—whether for communicating by email, storing 
documents in the cloud, or connecting with friends and colleagues 
through social media.13  Both individuals and businesses have become 
more reliant upon third-party cloud storage solutions, such as the 
services provided by the Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), because of 
their efficiency and ease of use.14 
Because of this increase in Internet usage and shift in storage 
solutions, Microsoft has suggested that the data privacy standards set 
                                                     
ure/Cloud-computing-timeline-illustrates-clouds-past-predicts-its-future (highlighting the 
history of cloud storage from the dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s through 2014). 
 10. Cloud storage is “the storing and accessing of data and programs through the 
internet, rather than through physical means such as hard drives.”  Newtek Bus. Servs., 
Inc., The Future of the Cloud, FORBES (July 8, 2015, 9:28 AM) [hereinafter Future of the 
Cloud], http://www.forbes.com/sites/thesba/2015/07/08/the-future-of-the-cloud. 
 11. MARIA C. PAPADAKIS & EILEEN L. COLLINS, DIV. OF SCI. RESEARCH STUDIES, NAT’L 
SCI. FOUND., THE APPLICATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN 
THE HOME:  WHERE ARE THE DATA AND WHAT DO THEY SAY? 11 (2001), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED452050.pdf (noting that in 1994, the earliest year 
for which data is available, only two percent of households had Internet access). 
 12. Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications:  A 
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1557, 1558 (2004). 
 13. See id. at 1574–75.  For example, Mulligan noted that in 2004, “[o]ver 112 
million individuals use[d] the Internet to search for information,” and that 
“[g]aming [and] listening to and downloading music” were “popular activities,” 
unlike when the Electronic Communications Privacy Act was first passed eighteen 
years earlier.  Id.; cf. Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data:  Designing for Transparency 
and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-
designing-for-transparency-and-trust (“[C]onsumers are aware that they’re under 
surveillance—even though they may be poorly informed about the specific types of 
data collected about them . . . .”). 
 14. See First Am. Compl. for Declaratory Judgment at para. 3, Microsoft Corp. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR, 2016 WL 3381727 (W.D. Wash. June 17, 
2016) [hereinafter Am. Compl.]; see also Future of the Cloud, supra note 10 (“Many 
[companies] are depending on the cloud to launch new business models, help 
streamline their supply chains, and provide applications and platforms to better 
manage and analyze data.”). 
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forth in the ECPA are no longer sufficient to protect cloud users’ 
communications and personal information.15  The company is 
challenging sections 2703 and 2705(b) of the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA),16 which governs the privacy of electronic communications17 
that have been in storage for various periods of time.18  Microsoft 
alleges that the government’s use of “no-notice warrants” under section 
270319 in conjunction with “secrecy orders” under section 270520 
                                                     
 15. See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 7; see also Mulligan, supra note 12, at 
1558 (noting that increased Internet usage “raise[s] questions about the adequacy of 
the privacy standards developed in 1986”). 
 16. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).  The Stored Communications Act (SCA) 
is part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).  See id. 
 17. The ECPA defines an “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in 
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
 18. See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 1. 
 19. Section 2703(b) provides, in relevant part, 
(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing 
service to disclose the contents of any . . . electronic communication . . . (A) 
without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental 
entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using 
State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 
Essentially, section 2703 of the SCA provides five procedures through which a 
“government entity” can require an electronic communications provider to disclose 
certain information about its subscribers:  (1) subpoena, (2) subpoena with prior 
notice to the subscriber or customer, (3) court order, (4) court order with prior 
notice to the subscriber or customers, or (5) search warrant.  Id. § 2703(b)(1).  
When using a search warrant, the government is not required to provide notice to 
the subscriber or customer, and because of the “probable cause” threshold required 
by a warrant, the government may access the entire contents of the subscriber or 
customer’s account.  In contrast, when using a subpoena, the government can only 
obtain more basic subscriber information without first notifying the subscriber or 
customer.  Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2002), https://cyber.harvard.edu/practicall 
awyering/Week9DOJECPAExcerpt.pdf. 
 20. Section 2705(b) provides, in its entirety, 
A governmental entity acting under section 2703, when it is not required to 
notify the subscriber or customer under section 2703(b)(1), or to the extent 
that it may delay such notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may 
apply to a court for an order commanding a provider of electronic 
communications service or remote computing service to whom a warrant, 
subpoena, or court order is directed, for such period as the court deems 
appropriate, not to notify any other person of the existence of the warrant, 
subpoena, or court order.  The court shall enter such an order if it 
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violate the company’s First Amendment rights and its cloud customers’ 
Fourth Amendment rights.21  In its Fourth Amendment claim, 
Microsoft asserts that secrecy orders illegally eliminate notice to the 
targets of the searches and seizures22 and unfairly prevent the company 
from being transparent with its customers.23 
Microsoft’s Fourth Amendment claim raises a unique standing 
issue—namely, whether Microsoft can bring the claim on behalf of its 
customers.  Generally speaking, a business may bring such a lawsuit,24 
but doing so based on a Fourth Amendment claim is distinctive 
because the standing inquiry requires a more substantive analysis of 
the issues.25  Specifically, for a business to bring a constitutional 
challenge on behalf of its customers, at least one customer must have 
standing to bring the claim himself; thus, if Microsoft’s customers do 
not have standing to sue, neither does Microsoft.26  However, 
establishing individual standing for the improper sharing of personal 
information or data has become more difficult after the United States 
                                                     
determines that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of 
the warrant, subpoena, or court order will result in— 
(1) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; 
(2) flight from prosecution; 
(3) destruction of or tampering with evidence; 
(4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or 
(5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a 
trial. 
18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
Section 2705 allows a “government entity” to seek a court order preventing an 
electronic communications provider from notifying its subscriber or customer of the 
existence of a search warrant, subpoena, or court order where the government entity 
would not otherwise be required to disclose the search.  Id.  This section provides for 
a lesser “reason to believe” threshold.  Id. 
 21. See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 7.  The government’s use of secrecy 
orders is relevant to both Microsoft’s First Amendment claim and its Fourth 
Amendment claim.  In its First Amendment claim, Microsoft argues that law 
enforcement’s excessive use of secrecy orders unconstitutionally prevents it from 
communicating with its customers about the government’s demands for their data.  
Microsoft’s First Amendment claim, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 22. See infra Section I.B. 
 23. Jim Kerstetter, Microsoft Goes on Offensive Against Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/technology/microsoft-goes-
on-offensive-against-justice-department.html. 
 24. Infra Section II.A.2. 
 25. Nadia B. Soree, The Demise of Fourth Amendment Standing:  From Standing Room 
to Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. L.J. 570, 571 (2008). 
 26. See infra Section III.B.1. 
PUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:41 PM 
978 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:971 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.27  This 
Comment builds on the numerous scholarly critiques of the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment standing doctrine by specifically 
highlighting the unique problems that arise from the Court’s narrow 
application of third-party Fourth Amendment standing.28 
This Comment argues that (1) under the current doctrine, 
Microsoft likely does not have standing to bring a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA on 
behalf of its customers, and (2) Microsoft and its customers should 
have standing to raise this claim by proposing a new test for the Court 
to follow under the circumstances. 
Part I provides background on the relevant sections of the SCA, 
Microsoft’s lawsuit, traditional standing jurisprudence, and Fourth 
Amendment standing jurisprudence.  Part II discusses the Court’s 
hesitance to extend its third-party standing jurisprudence to Fourth 
Amendment challenges.  Part III notes that Microsoft likely does not 
have standing under the Court’s current jurisprudence but advocates 
adopting a relaxed hybrid Fourth Amendment standing doctrine 
where an individual is hindered from raising a claim himself.  Part III 
also advocates limiting the impact of Spokeo on the Fourth 
Amendment to preserve individual privacy protections.  A new 
standing doctrine is the best way to ensure that businesses providing 
third-party cloud-based technologies have a forum in which to raise 
Fourth Amendment challenges against privacy laws. 
I. BACKGROUND 
“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . . .” 
—Justice Bradley29 
                                                     
 27. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (holding that a data breach resulting in the sharing of 
personal information was not concrete to satisfy Article III standing requirements); 
see infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983) (“[T]he doctrine [of Fourth Amendment standing] is 
troublesome, for it is impossible to articulate any purpose of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment exclusionary rule that is not undercut to some extent by a 
requirement of standing.”); Soree, supra note 25, at 571 (“[T]he Court has 
developed an unduly narrow vision of [Fourth Amendment] standing.”). 
 29. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
PUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:41 PM 
2017] CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF ABUSED PRIVACY RIGHTS 979 
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Congress passed the ECPA in 1986 with the intention of protecting 
wire, oral, and electronic communications while they are being made, 
transmitted, and stored.30  The ECPA provides a complex privacy 
framework that has become increasingly difficult to navigate as 
technology rapidly advances.  Within the ECPA are various 
subcomponents, including the SCA,31 which is a provision governing 
the privacy of electronic communications that have been in storage 
for various amounts of time.32  The SCA contains dense, complex 
language that very few courts have explained or interpreted,33 and it 
has gone relatively unchanged since its enactment in 1986.34 
In response to the growing disparity between the language of the 
SCA and the state of technology, Microsoft has challenged sections 
2703 and 2705 of the SCA.35  Section 2703 contains the bulk of the 
privacy protections afforded by the SCA, providing certain 
mechanisms that the government must use when it seeks the 
disclosure of electronic communications.36  Specifically, section 
2703(b)(1)(A) “no-notice warrants” allow the government—with a 
warrant and without notice to the subscriber—to require an 
electronic communications or cloud storage service provider to 
                                                     
 30. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 
2510–22 (2012), U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliber 
ty/authorities/statutes/1285 (last updated July 30, 2013) (providing a brief 
explanation of the ECPA). 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 32. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 1208 (“Despite [the SCA’s] obvious importance, the statute remains 
poorly understood.”). 
 34. Congress has made several minor amendments to the SCA in 1988, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006, and 2009, but none substantially changed the law.  See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.  However, Congress is currently contemplating a major substantive 
change to the SCA for the first time—a change that seeks to address the problems 
highlighted in this Comment.  See Email Privacy Act, H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2016); see also Press Release, Representative Kevin Yoder (R-KS), Bipartisan Group 
Introduces Bill to Protect Online Privacy (Feb. 4, 2015), http://yoder.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/bipartisan-group-introduces-bill-to-protect-online-privacy (“The 
federal government is using an arcane 1986 law to conduct warrantless searches of the 
personal email accounts and other digital communication of the American people . . . .  
The last time Congress updated our email privacy laws, we were two years removed from 
the release of the first Macintosh computer.”). 
 35. See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 4. 
 36. Kerr, supra note 32, at 1218. 
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disclose the contents of any electronic communication.37  Section 
2705(b) “secrecy orders” allow the government to request that a 
court delay providers from notifying subscribers that their accounts 
are subject to government investigation; if the court has a “reason to 
believe” that there may be an adverse consequence to providing 
notice, such as “seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly 
delaying a trial,” it must grant the request.38  Because there is no time 
limit specified in section 2705(b)—only “for such period as the court 
deems appropriate”—the “delay” could last indefinitely.39  
Conversely, when communication sent through the post is the subject 
of a search or seizure, government access requires a warrant, and 
there is an implicit right to notice at all times, regardless of how long 
the mail has been unopened or stored in a mailbox.40 
B. Microsoft Corp. v. United States Department of Justice 
Microsoft is becoming somewhat notorious for challenging 
government practices under the SCA and bringing individual data 
privacy issues into the spotlight.41  Microsoft’s latest focus is on the 
                                                     
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A); see also Burnside, supra note 6, at 516 
(anticipating the need for continual review of the ECPA’s language to keep up with 
the progression of technology). 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (“Letters and sealed packages . . . in 
the mail are as fully guarded [under the Fourth Amendment] from examination and 
inspection . . . as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles. . . .  Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under . . . 
warrant . . . .”); see Amy Webb, Send Letters, Not Emails, SLATE (June 12, 2013, 5:08 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/data_mine_1/2013/06/nsa_surveil 
lance_why_the_post_office_doesn_t_spy_on_your_mail_the_way_nsa.html (noting 
that in 2006, President Bush’s administration argued that the Patriot Act permitted 
the government to intercept snail mail during exigent circumstances, which was 
widely criticized because such a policy plainly contravened existing mail protection 
laws); see also Thor Benson, It’s Not Just the NSA—The IRS Is Reading Your Emails Too, 
TRUTHDIG (July 10, 2015), http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/its_not_just_the_ 
nsa_the_irs_is_reading_your_emails_too_20150710 (“Americans overwhelmingly 
believe email should be protected by a warrant, just like a phone call or snail-mail 
letter.” (quoting Gabe Rottman of the American Civil Liberties Union)). 
 41. See Jennifer Daskal, A New Lawsuit from Microsoft:  No More Gag Orders!, JUST 
SEC. (Apr. 14, 2016, 12:56 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/30583/challenge-
microsoft-gag-orders (drawing attention to Microsoft’s two-year dispute with the 
United States government over customer emails stored on servers in another 
country); see also Jay Greene & Devlin Barrett, Microsoft Sues Justice Department Over 
Secret Customer Data Searches, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2016, 8:03 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-sues-justice-department-over-secret-customer-
data-searches-1460649720; supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text (discussing 
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federal government’s use of secrecy orders and no-notice warrants, 
which together prevent the company’s customers from receiving 
notice when their data is searched or seized by the government.42 
On April 14, 2016, Microsoft filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that no-notice warrants issued under section 2703(b)(1)(a) 
of the SCA used in combination with secrecy orders issued under 
2705(b) violate, on their face,43 the company’s First Amendment rights 
and its cloud customers’ Fourth Amendment rights.44  Microsoft argues 
that “its customers have a right to know when the government obtains 
a warrant to read their emails,”45 and therefore the government’s use 
of sections 2703 and 2705 in tandem is unconstitutional. 
Microsoft alleges that from September 2014 through May 2016, the 
government made over 6000 demands for customer information 
stored on the cloud; more than half of those demands were 
accompanied by a secrecy order, and about a third of those demands 
with a secrecy order also contained an indefinite bar on disclosure.46  
Microsoft notes that “the increase in government demands for online 
data and the simultaneous increase in secrecy [orders]” have the 
                                                     
Microsoft’s current complaints about the government’s privacy breaches under the 
SCA). 
On July 14, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in 
Microsoft’s favor, holding that “[section] 2703 of the Stored Communications Act 
does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against U.S.–based service providers 
warrants for the seizure of customer e-mail content that is stored exclusively on 
foreign server[s].”  Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-cv-2985, slip op. at 2 (2d 
Cir. July 14, 2016). 
 42. Daskal, supra note 41; see supra notes 19–20 (providing the statutory language). 
 43. Compl. Decl. J. at para. 2, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-
cv-00538 (W.D. Wash. filed Apr. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Compl.].  When challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute, a claim may either be brought as applied or on its 
face.  Facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are generally permitted.  City 
of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2449 (2015). 
 44. See Compl., supra note 43, at para. 2.  As of this writing, over seventy parties 
have filed amicus briefs in Microsoft Corp., including Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, 
Amazon.com, Dropbox, Snapchat, and other electronic communications providers.  
See No. 2:16-cv-00538 (N.D. Wash. 2016). 
 45. See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 1. 
 46. See id. at para. 16.  Microsoft initially pled a lesser number of requests for 
customer data.  Compl., supra note 43, at para. 16; see also Gregg Keizer, Microsoft:  
Government’s Data Gag Order Practices Worse than First Thought, COMPUTERWORLD (June 
23, 2016, 12:09 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3088103/data-
privacy/microsoft-governments-data-gag-order-practices-worse-than-first-thought.html 
(pointing out that Microsoft upped the number of data demands it claimed to have 
received from the government in the months preceding the original complaint). 
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potential “to undermine confidence in the privacy of the cloud,” 
thereby reducing the likelihood that businesses will rely on third-
party cloud storage solutions.47 
More specifically, Microsoft suggests that sections 2703 and 2705 
subject its cloud storage customers to a lesser standard of privacy for 
choosing to store their data on the cloud as compared to other 
storage options.48  They argue that under the laws governing paper 
files and data stored on local servers or hard drives, customers have 
implicit notice of the execution of a warrant, allowing them to assert 
their rights or challenges accordingly.49  Conversely, when customer 
information is stored on the cloud by a company like Microsoft, the 
government can request the information it seeks directly from the 
company without involving the customer—the actual target of the 
search.50  Microsoft claims that there is little, if any, explanation to 
justify this lesser privacy standard.51 
As reliance on third-party cloud storage has grown, Microsoft argues 
that “the transition [to third-party storage] does not alter the 
fundamental constitutional requirement that the government must—
with few exceptions—give notice when it searches and seizes the private 
information or communications of individuals or businesses.”52  
Microsoft recognizes that exceptional circumstances may arise where the 
government’s interest in conducting an investigation would justify a 
temporary secrecy order, but the company objects to the government’s 
habitual use of indefinite secrecy orders.53 
The government has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing 
or, in the alternative, failure to state a claim.54  The government 
                                                     
 47. Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 5. 
 48. Id. at para. 7. 
 49. Id. at para. 14; see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (holding 
that in a “reasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the 
right to know when the government has searched or seized their property). 
 50. Kerstetter, supra note 23. 
 51. Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 1 (“People do not give up their rights 
when they move their private information from physical storage to the cloud.”). 
 52. Id. at para. 3. 
 53. Id. at para. 6.; cf. Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance 
Program and the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement:  Lessons from Justice Powell and 
the Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1280–92, 1303–19 (2008) (analyzing 
President Bush’s claim that the government has the authority to order warrantless 
searches and seizures of electronic communications between American citizens and 
persons abroad in the name of national security). 
 54. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), 
Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-cv-00538-JLR (W.D. Wash. filed July 
22, 2016), ECF No. 38 [hereinafter Mot. to Dismiss].  This Comment does not 
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claims “Microsoft’s challenge effectively asks [the court] to adjudicate 
the lawfulness of thousands of such court orders from across the 
United States.”55  Regarding standing, the government’s Motion to 
Dismiss specifically alleges that Microsoft has failed to state a 
sufficient injury in fact56 and that Microsoft’s claims may not be 
redressed through declaratory relief.57 
Microsoft relies on the test the Supreme Court established in Powers v. 
Ohio58 to assert its standing to “vindicate its customers’ Fourth 
Amendment rights” because the company’s customers do not know 
their rights have been violated, and they therefore lack the knowledge to 
challenge the SCA provisions.59  Whether Microsoft was correct in 
relying on Powers to argue standing, however, is questionable at best. 
In its Motion to Dismiss, the government rejected Microsoft’s 
contention that the company satisfies the standing requirement.60  
However, the government does not contest that Powers provides the 
applicable standing framework.61  The government primarily argues 
that Microsoft has not demonstrated that it has suffered a sufficient 
injury in fact to establish its standing as a third party.62  Microsoft did 
not submit any of the relevant secrecy orders for the court to analyze 
and determine the extent of injury.63  The government also 
emphasized that the constitutionality of the secrecy orders would 
require a fact-specific, individualized review by the court.64 
                                                     
address the merits of the government’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, only the 
12(b)(1) claim for lack of standing.  Infra Section II.B. 
 55. Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 54, at 2. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
 57. Id. at 8. 
 58. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
 59. Id. at 410–11; Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 38. 
 60. Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 54, at 6–8. 
 61. Id. at 11. 
 62. Id. at 6.  The government also asserts that Microsoft lacks standing “because a 
favorable judgment would not redress its alleged injury.”  Id. at 8–9.  However, that 
argument is not central to this Comment’s analysis. 
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. Id. at 7–8 (“Section 2705(b) orders are sought in a wide range of 
investigations and under many different circumstances, and in each instance a court 
has determined that the requirements of the statute are met and an order of 
‘appropriate’ duration is justified.”). 
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C. Non-Fourth Amendment Standing and Justiciability 
To invoke the court’s power to resolve a claim, a party is required 
to show that it has proper standing to sue.65  Absent standing, a court 
does not have the authority to reach or decide the merits of the 
underlying issues.66  Standing is founded in Article III of the United 
States Constitution, which limits the role of the federal courts to 
resolving “cases” and “controversies.”67  This jurisdictional restriction 
requires that issues presented to the court be “definite and concrete, 
not hypothetical or abstract.”68  When reaching the merits of a claim 
would require a court to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the 
actions taken by another branch of the federal government, the 
standing requirement must be strictly applied.69  It is the plaintiff’s 
burden to demonstrate that the requirements of standing have been 
met for his or her lawsuit to proceed.70 
The purpose of the standing requirement is to enable truly adverse 
and personally affected parties to effectively frame the legal issues, 
litigate the case, and make the court aware of the practical 
consequences of the outcome.71  Further, the standing requirement 
                                                     
 65. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining standing 
to be “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 
III” of the Constitution); see also Soree, supra note 25, at 581 (defining standing as “the 
ability of a given litigant to invoke the powers of the court for relief”). 
 66. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990) (noting that Article III “serves to identify those disputes which are 
appropriately resolved through the judicial process”). 
 68. Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945); see Gov’t & Civic Emps. Org. 
Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957) (per curiam) (“Federal courts will not 
pass upon constitutional contentions presented in an abstract rather than in a 
concrete form.”). 
 69. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) (“[T]he law of [Article III] 
standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” (quoting 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014))); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“[T]he power of the Federal Judiciary may not be 
permitted to intrude upon the powers given to the other branches.”).  But see Allen, 
468 U.S. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court could be saying that it will 
require a more direct causal connection when it is troubled by the separation of 
powers implications of the case before it.  That approach confuses the standing 
doctrine with the justiciability of the issues that respondents seek to raise.”). 
 70. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
 71. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988); see 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (characterizing the “gist” of the standing 
requirement as whether “the [litigant] alleged . . . a personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy”). 
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promotes judicial efficiency by requiring a litigant, after he or she has 
met the Article III “case or controversy” requirement, to meet 
additional judicially-created standing requirements.72 
The Supreme Court set out this strict set of requirements to establish 
standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.73  It articulated a three-part test 
to determine whether a litigant has proper standing to raise a claim: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’  Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed 
to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a 
favorable decision.”74 
This Comment focuses specifically on the injury in fact requirement 
for standing.75 
In Lujan, petitioners challenged an amendment limiting the scope 
of the Endangered Species Act’s protection.76  The Endangered 
Species Act originally required federal agencies to consult with the 
Secretary of the Interior regarding agency actions in the United 
States and abroad to ensure that those actions would not jeopardize 
endangered species or destroy natural habitats, but the amendment 
modified the language of the statute so that it only applied “to actions 
[occurring] within the United States or on the high seas.”77  The 
Court acknowledged that the “desire to . . . observe an animal species, 
even for purely esthetic purposes” is a sufficient legal interest for the 
purpose of establishing standing.78  However, the petitioners failed to 
demonstrate that their interest had been or would be harmed by 
government-funded activities abroad occurring as a result of the 
                                                     
 72. Soree, supra note 25, at 582 n.77. 
 73. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 74. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted). 
 75. The Court has identified several key purposes behind the injury in fact 
requirement, including, but not limited to (1) restricting access to the judicial 
process to litigants who will be zealous advocates, (2) giving the right to sue to those 
personally impacted by a government policy to ensure adequate representation of 
their interests, and (3) protecting the separation of powers.  FALLON ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 117 (7th ed. 2015) 
(citations omitted). 
 76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58. 
 77. Id. at 558.  See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 78. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63. 
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amendment because “‘some day’ intentions—without any description 
of concrete plans . . . do not support a finding of the ‘actual or 
imminent’ injury” as required by Article III.79 
On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Spokeo, 
extending the injury in fact requirement to challenges alleging 
violations of individuals’ procedural rights.80  In that case, an 
individual claimed that Spokeo, Inc., a company whose website 
aggregates personal data from the Internet, violated the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about his 
wealth on its website.81  The Court decided that even though the 
individual could show a particularized injury from the violation of his 
statutory rights under the FCRA, a procedural violation on its own is 
not enough to establish a concrete injury.82  The Court held that 
“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of 
a statutory violation,” and that an allegation of a violation of a 
procedural right on its own does not “automatically satisf[y] the 
injury-in-fact requirement.”83  Therefore, at the pleadings stage, a 
plaintiff must clearly allege an injury in fact that is both concrete and 
particularized.84  Accordingly, where an individual’s procedural or 
statutory rights have been violated, it has become particularly difficult 
to plead a sufficient harm to confer standing. 
                                                     
 79. Id. at 564 (“[T]he [petitioners]’ profession of an ‘inten[t]’ to return to the places 
they had visited before—where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the 
opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species—is simply not enough.”). 
 80. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016); see also Andrew Hessick, 
Establishing Standing After Spokeo v. Robins, CASETEXT (May 19, 2016), 
https://casetext.com/posts/establishing-standing-after-spokeo-v-robins (emphasizing 
that the decision in Spokeo changed the law of standing). 
 81. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544–46. 
 82. Id. at 1549. 
 83. Id.; see also Hessick, supra note 80. 
 84. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.  “Particularization” requires that an injury “affect 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”  Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).  
“Concreteness” requires that an injury “actually exist.”  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009)). 
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D. Fourth Amendment Standing Jurisprudence85 
1. Fourth Amendment standing pre-Rakas v. Illinois 
The Supreme Court first dealt directly with the question of Fourth 
Amendment standing in 1951 in United States v. Jeffers.86  In Jeffers, the 
Court held that an individual had standing to challenge a seizure of 
contraband narcotics in connection with a search of a hotel room 
registered to the individual’s relatives.87  In so holding, the Court 
reasoned that the defendant had a possessory property interest in the 
drugs.88  It explained that the defendant was not entitled to have the 
drugs returned to him because they were contraband, but he did not 
forfeit his property rights to the drugs for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.89 
In 1960, the Court continued to expand its Fourth Amendment 
standing doctrine.  In Jones v. United States,90 it identified other ways 
someone can bring a Fourth Amendment claim absent a possessory 
or property interest in the place searched or items seized:  (1) the 
“automatic standing” rule, (2) the “target theory,” and (3) the 
“legitimately on premises” test.91  The “automatic standing rule” was 
articulated first by the circuit courts and was adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Jones.92  In that case, the Court determined that to make an 
effective showing of standing, a “movant [must] claim either to have 
owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial 
possessory interest in the premises searched.”93  The “target theory” 
was based on the concept that to suppress evidence, someone “must 
have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the 
search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice 
                                                     
 85. This Comment is only concerned with the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment standing jurisprudence.  Richard Kuhns, an expert on evidence and 
criminal procedure, has fully discussed Fourth Amendment standing jurisprudence 
in the lower federal courts.  See generally Richard B. Kuhns, The Concept of Personal 
Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 IOWA L. REV. 493, 493 (1980) 
(noting that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914), which established the exclusionary rule of evidence, lower federal courts 
developed various standing requirements to limit the application of the rule). 
 86. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).  Prior to 1951, the Supreme Court had only dealt with 
Fourth Amendment standing by analogy.  See Soree, supra note 25, at 590–91. 
 87. Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 50, 52–54. 
 88. Id. at 52–54. 
 89. Id. at 54. 
 90. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
 91. Soree, supra note 25, at 592–93. 
 92. Jones, 362 U.S. at 261, 263. 
 93. Id. at 261. 
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only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a 
search or seizure directed at someone else.”94  The “legitimately on 
premises” test was more broad, permitting those who are legally 
present on the premises where a search or seizure occurs to 
challenge the legality of the invasion.95 
2. Impact of Rakas on Fourth Amendment standing 
In 1978, the Supreme Court held for the first time that an 
individual litigant cannot assert a claim for a Fourth Amendment 
violation unless he or she has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the place searched.96  In Rakas v. Illinois,97 a criminal defendant 
argued that because police found the evidence serving as the basis for 
his conviction in his friend’s car, it could not be admitted at trial 
because the search of that car violated the Fourth Amendment.98  
The Court held that passengers have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in another individual’s automobile and, thus, do not have 
standing to challenge the search of the automobile.99  In doing so, 
the Court completely dismissed the “target” theory from Jones, 
emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment is an individual right that 
serves to protect the public against unlawful searches or seizures in 
places where an individual has an expectation of privacy.100  The 
Rakas decision effectively eliminated standing as an independent 
inquiry in the Fourth Amendment context and required a substantive 
inquiry into whether the claim implicates the Fourth Amendment 
before making a determination on standing.101 
The Court continued its overhaul of the “automatic standing” rule 
in United States v. Salvucci102 and Rawlings v. Kentucky.103  In Salvucci, 
two individuals were charged with unlawful possession of stolen mail 
                                                     
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 266–67. 
 96. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142, 148 (1978); see also United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).  The 
question remains, however, whether the fruits of the challenged search or seizure 
should be excluded from evidence during trial.  See Soree, supra note 25, at 570–71. 
 97. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 98. Id. at 130. 
 99. Id. at 148. 
 100. Id. at 134–35 (“A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure 
only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third 
person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights 
infringed.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1. 
 101. Soree, supra note 25, at 571. 
 102. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
 103. 448 U.S. 98, 103 (1980). 
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after the police seized the mail during a search of a family member’s 
apartment.104  Relying on its decision in Rakas, the Court concluded 
that the individuals did not have a “legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the invaded place.”105  Moreover, in Rawlings, an individual was 
charged with and convicted for drug trafficking offenses after police 
found the drugs through an illegal search of another individual’s 
bag.106  The Court again relied on Rakas to conclude that the 
individual did not have a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in 
another’s bag and therefore was unable to challenge his conviction.107  
This line of cases demonstrates that until very recently, Fourth 
Amendment standing essentially turned on whether a Fourth 
Amendment “search” or “seizure” took place and whether the 
individual’s claim met the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
(“REP test”) the Court developed later in Katz v. United States.108 
3. Katz and Fourth Amendment protection of electronic communications 
The historical Trespass Doctrine articulated a “physical intrusion” 
requirement for a search or seizure to fall under the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment—a requirement that cannot be met by intrusions 
on email and other electronic records.109  For example, in Olmstead v. 
United States,110 the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ claims 
that wiretapping phone calls violated their Fourth Amendment rights 
because the government did not physically intrude into the 
petitioners’ homes or offices.111  Furthermore, and perhaps even 
more concerning than Olmstead, in Goldman v. United States,112 the 
Supreme Court held that entering the petitioner’s office to install a 
listening device did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation on 
the grounds that the trespass did not materially aid in the use of the 
listening device, despite the fact that the trespass was necessary to 
install the listening device.113 
                                                     
 104. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85. 
 105. Id. at 91–92 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143). 
 106. 448 U.S. at 100–01. 
 107. Id. at 104. 
 108. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 109. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942) (holding that 
information heard with a listening device was not illegal due to “trespass or unlawful 
entry”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928) (“The insertions 
were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants.”). 
 110. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 111. Id. at 464. 
 112. 316 U.S. 129, 129 (1942), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 113. Id. at 134–35. 
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These decisions are troubling because they demonstrate the Court’s 
unwillingness to extend the Fourth Amendment’s protection to electronic 
means of communication.  The Supreme Court did not extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to electronic communications until Katz when 
the Court established the reasonable expectation of privacy test and 
determined the threshold question in a Fourth Amendment analysis to be 
whether law enforcement had conducted a search.114 
In Katz v. United States, the Court moved away from the Trespass 
Doctrine and instead emphasized the REP test.115  The Supreme 
Court in Katz held that taping a microphone to a public phone booth 
for the purpose of listening to calls constituted a search that violated 
the Fourth Amendment.116  The Court was less concerned with 
whether there was a physical intrusion into the phone booth and 
more concerned with the privacy that a person who used a phone 
booth would expect.117  The REP test articulated in Katz has two 
elements:  (1) a person must have a subjective expectation of privacy, 
and (2) society must also be ready and willing to accept that 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.118 
Later, the Supreme Court revived the notion of a “physical intrusion” 
in United States v. Jones.119  To track the movement of a suspected 
                                                     
 114. See Orin Kerr, Answering Justice Alito’s Question:  What Makes an Expectation of 
Privacy “Reasonable”?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/28/answering-justice-alitos-question-what-
makes-an-expectation-of-privacy-reasonable (“On one hand, a search might refer to 
merely looking for an item . . . .  On the other hand, a search might mean the act of 
observing an item closely . . . .  Finally, a search might refer to the physical act of 
looking through a space in ways that expose its contents to plain view.”). 
The Supreme Court began to formulate what constitutes a reasonable expectation 
of privacy as early as 1886, when it indicated that the Fourth Amendment should 
“apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employ[ee]s of the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886). 
 115. Id. at 353. 
 116. Id. at 351, 353. 
 117. Id. at 351–53 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not . . . subject [to] 
Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” (citations omitted)) 
(overruling, in part, Olmstead and Goldman’s physical intrusion requirement). 
 118. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kerr, supra note 114. 
In her concurrence in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), Justice Sotomayor 
advocated for a full adoption of Justice Harlan’s test, placing significant value on 
protecting individuals from violations of a subjectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 119. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
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narcotics trafficker, federal agents placed a GPS tracker on a vehicle 
registered to the suspect’s wife.120  The federal agents then used the GPS 
to track the vehicle for twenty-eight days and used the information as the 
basis for an indictment against the suspect.121  The Court held that the 
warrantless122 installation of a GPS tracker on the vehicle constituted a 
search that violated the Fourth Amendment.123  The Court noted that 
Katz did not repudiate the Trespass Doctrine, it merely provided 
another means to establish a Fourth Amendment violation by 
recognizing an expectation of privacy in more than just the home.124 
In defining what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” 
the Supreme Court has not been clear.125  Several members of the 
Court, in fact, have even gone so far as to expressly recognize the 
ambiguity of the REP test: 
It involves a degree of circularity . . . and judges are apt to confuse 
their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical 
reasonable person to which the Katz test looks . . . .  In addition, 
the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical 
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy 
expectations.  But technology can change those expectations.  
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which 
popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce 
significant change in popular attitudes.126 
                                                     
 120. Id. at 948. 
 121. Id. 
 122. The government did initially obtain a warrant authorizing the installation of 
the GPS tracker on the target vehicle within ten days; however, the agents did not 
install the device until the eleventh day, after the warrant had expired.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 949. 
 124. Id. at 950–51. 
 125. Jeremy Fogel, From the Bench:  A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 40 LITIG., 
Spring 2014, at 1, 1, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation_journal/2 
013-14/spring/a_reasonable_expectation_privacy.html (“Lay understanding, legal 
authority, and technological reality often bear little resemblance to each other and are 
frequently in extreme tension.”); Kerr, supra note 114; see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“We have no talisman that determines in all cases 
those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”); Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“No single factor determines whether an 
individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be 
free of government intrusion not authorized by a warrant.”); Daniel B. Yeager, Search, 
Seizure and the Positive Law:  Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 280 (1993) (noting that the Court has never clearly 
defined privacy or provided a set of workable guidelines). 
 126. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (writing for himself and Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan). 
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The Katz decision essentially requires that the Supreme Court define 
(1) privacy and (2) when privacy can reasonably be expected;127 
however, the Court’s precedent has not sufficiently defined either.128  
The Supreme Court has instead resorted to drawing lines between 
invasive practices and less invasive practices, concluding that the 
former satisfies the REP test and that the latter does not.129  Part of this 
inquiry turns on determining “what should be a search.”130 
Courts have historically found that, absent special circumstances, 
the “home” receives the utmost Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection, and the government must obtain a warrant issued upon 
probable cause to conduct a search or seizure.131  Applying Supreme 
Court precedent to an individual’s use of the Internet poses a 
significant legal issue because Internet users do not have a true 
“home” in or on the Internet.132 
4. Post-Spokeo Fourth Amendment standing 
As a result of the Court’s decision in Spokeo, it is more difficult for 
plaintiffs alleging procedural rights violations to establish standing.133  
That decision requires that an individual satisfy the concrete harm 
requirement for standing to assert violations of a procedural right, 
                                                     
 127. CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 105–06 (Andrew E. Taslitz et al. eds., 
5th ed. 2014). 
 128. Generally, the Court has concluded that privacy falls into two categories, but 
it has failed to provide additional guidance.  One commentator described these 
categories of privacy as follows: 
The privacy at stake covers both being in private—doing what one chooses to 
do, and with whom one chooses, without intrusion—and having in private—
preserving what one treasures, or merely possesses, unexposed to the world.  
Both kinds of privacy enable the individual to constitute himself as the 
unique person he is.  Both are aspects of the fully realized life.  And both 
importantly provide conditions for the realization of the common good as 
well. 
Lloyd L. Weinred, The Fourth Amendment Today, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  ORIGINAL 
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 184, 185–86 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 
1991) (emphasis added). 
 129. See Kerr, supra note 114. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Kerr, supra note 32, at 1209. 
 132. See id. at 1209–10 (“[It] is really just a block of ones and zeroes stored somewhere 
on somebody else’s computer . . . .  Our most private information ends up being sent to 
private third parties and held far away on remote network servers.”); see also Webb, supra 
note 40 (“The very nature of email is anti-control and anti-privacy . . . .”). 
 133. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
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thereby requiring more than just a particularized, personal harm.134  
As the Court explained, a harm resulting from a procedural rights 
violation, unlike substantive rights violations, does not necessarily 
satisfy the injury in fact requirement because procedural violations 
are more likely to be divorced from a concrete harm.135  It is unclear 
what long-term impact the Spokeo decision will have on the Fourth 
Amendment standing doctrine because the decision was only 
rendered in May of 2016.136 
Given that the Fourth Amendment largely safeguards procedural 
rights,137 Spokeo may have a significant impact on Fourth Amendment 
standing doctrine.  The Fourth Amendment’s procedural safeguards 
include “probable cause, judicial oversight of police intrusions,” and 
the warrant particularity requirement.138  However, the Supreme 
                                                     
 134. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (noting that 
particularization is necessary but not sufficient to establish injury in fact); supra note 
82 and accompanying text (highlighting the distinction between a “concrete” harm 
and a “particularized” harm). 
 135. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549; see also Richard L. Heppner Jr., Understanding 
Standing After “Spokeo v. Robins,” LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 22, 2016), 
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202760588959/Understanding-Standing-
After-Spokeo-v-Robins (arguing that a “purely procedural failing is not enough” to 
establish a real injury following Spokeo); Hessick, supra note 80 (discussing ways in 
which certain procedural harms can result in concrete injuries). 
 136. One lower court applying Spokeo concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to suggest that information obtained through a data breach would be used 
to the detriment of the victims of the breach.  Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., No. 15-cv-
00882 (CRC), 2016 WL 4250232 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2016).  On the other hand, the 
Sixth Circuit concluded that it would be “unreasonable to expect Plaintiffs to wait for 
actual misuse” of their data “before taking steps to ensure their own personal . . . 
security.”  Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027 
(6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016). 
One legal commentator has suggested that the “actual harm” requirement is a 
“significant development” that could “bring some measure of relief to companies 
tasked with storing vast quantities of consumer data.”  John Devine et al., Plaintiffs 
Cannot Bring Data Breach Lawsuits Without Evidence that Information Will Be Used to 
Harm, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
plaintiffs-cannot-bring-data-breach-15526. 
Justices Blackmun and O’Connor predicted this interpretation issue following the 
Court’s decision in Lujan.  They feared that “the Court [sought] to impose fresh 
limitations on the constitutional authority of Congress to allow citizen suits in the 
federal courts for injuries deemed ‘procedural’ in nature,” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 589–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1992), and noted that “[o]nly later 
cases [would] tell what the Court [meant] by its intimation that ‘procedural’ injuries 
are not constitutionally cognizable injuries,” id. at 602. 
 137. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 197, 199 (1993). 
 138. Id. 
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Court has often found that the Fourth Amendment serves to protect 
a greater—and substantive—right to privacy.139 
The American people have long regarded the sharing of personal 
data to be harmful in itself, even moreso than a mere procedural 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.140  Congress has repeatedly 
passed bills and enacted statutes to protect individuals from the 
uncalled-for disclosure of their personal information.141  It follows 
that sharing information pursuant to an unreasonable search or 
seizure of personal information or communications to a federal 
agency could cause an additional, substantive harm. 
The Spokeo Court issued its decision in the context of a violation of 
the FCRA, a statute enacted in part to ensure the privacy of personal 
information shared with credit reporting agencies.142  Similarly, in 
Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.,143 insurance policyholders sued after a data 
breach resulted in the release of their “names, birth dates, email 
addresses, and subscriber identification numbers.”144  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that, despite the 
company’s alleged failure to safeguard its policyholders’ personal 
information as required by statute,145 there was not a sufficient injury 
in fact to justify standing because the policyholders’ information was 
not actually misused by the perpetrators of the data hack.146 
                                                     
 139. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that the 
“penumbras” of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments together “create 
zones of privacy”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy is “no less important than any other right carefully and 
particularly reserved to the people”). 
 140. See Public Opinion on Privacy, ELEC. INFO. PRIVACY CTR., https://epic.org/privac 
y/survey (last updated Jan. 26, 2017) (noting that individuals wish to have control 
over their personal information and that privacy laws were strengthened to “protect 
their personal information from the government and commercial entities”).  But see 
Cheryl Conner, Sharing Too Much?  It’ll Cost You, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2012, 9:11 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2012/10/19/sharing-too-much-
itll-cost-you (exemplifying how much data individuals share online through social 
media platforms). 
 141. See supra note 5 (providing examples of the bills and statutes enacted to 
protect personal information). 
 142. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1540 (2016). 
 143. No. 15-cv-00882 (CRC), 2016 WL 4250232 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2016). 
 144. Id. at *1 (noting that social security numbers were not the subject of the data 
breach).  If social security numbers had been shared, then perhaps the injury would 
have at least been closer to sufficient.  The court did not explicitly discuss that 
scenario, however. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at *2 (“‘[A]llegations of possible future injury’ do not satisfy constitutional 
standing requirements.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 
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If courts do not regard the mere sharing of personal data as a 
sufficient injury in fact to establish standing, a Fourth Amendment 
claim post-Spokeo will likely require a more significant harm than a 
warrantless search or seizure alone.  A court would likely find that an 
individual has not suffered an injury in fact until the fruits of an 
improper search or seizure are used against him or her, resulting in 
criminal proceedings, civil sanctions, denial of immigration benefits, 
or another similarly substantial harm.147 
5. Case study:  Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA148 serves as a fairly recent 
example of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment standing 
jurisprudence.  Amnesty International USA (“AI”), a human rights 
organization, facially challenged the constitutionality of a provision of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)149—another 
provision of the ECPA—allowing electronic surveillance that serves 
foreign intelligence and national security purposes without notice to 
the subject of surveillance.150  AI suggested that there was an 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that its communications with 
foreign actors would be intercepted in the future pursuant to this 
provision of FISA.151  The Supreme Court found that this hypothetical 
future harm was insufficient to establish standing to raise a Fourth 
Amendment claim even though AI would be unable to later prove 
that they were the subjects of wiretapping due to the secret nature of 
the FISA surveillance program.152  The Court noted that “[t]he 
                                                     
1147 (2013))); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (noting that a violation of a right in 
itself “concern[s] particularization, not concreteness”). 
 147. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); see also Soree, supra note 25, at 
582 (“[A]ny defendant seeking to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence arguably 
has [met her Article III burden] . . . .”). 
 148. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 149. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 150. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. 
 151. Id. at 1147. 
 152. Id. at 1148–49 (remarking that respondents did not have standing based on a 
“highly attenuated chain of possibilities”).  The Court found it “speculative” that (1) 
the government would target the parties that AI was in communication with, (2) the 
government would rely on the challenged section of FISA to monitor the 
communications, (3) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would authorize 
the surveillance, (4) the surveillance would correctly intercept the intended 
communications, and (5) that AI’s communications would be part of the intercepted 
communications.  Id. at 1148–50.  For further discussion on standing to litigate 
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assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one 
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”153  This 
language is significant because this reasoning does not provide an 
opportunity to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge unless an 
individual can prove a concrete, personal injury. 
Similarly, in United States v. Richardson,154 an individual lacked 
standing to challenge the CIA’s actions under Article I, Section 9, 
Clause 7 of the Constitution requiring “a regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money”155 
because it constituted a “generalized grievance.”156  The Court said, 
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this 
issue, no one can do so.  In a very real sense, the absence of any 
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to 
the argument that the subject matter is committed to the 
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.157 
Even though Richardson was not decided in the Fourth Amendment 
context, the case serves to highlight the underlying separation of 
powers concerns associated with the Court’s standing inquiry. 
II. MICROSOFT’S OPTIONS FOR ASSERTING THIRD-PARTY STANDING 
“More than 120 years after Justice Bradley’s call to vigilance against 
‘stealthy encroachments,’ the federal government has more than taken its first 
steps towards crossing the constitutional boundaries of the people’s right to 
privacy; it has walked for miles.” 
—Nadia B. Soree158 
A. Third-Party Standing 
In general, a plaintiff may not rely upon the legal rights of others 
when asserting a claim for relief.159  An organization or another 
similar third party, however, has the capacity to bring a legal claim on 
                                                     
under FISA, see Ben Cook, The New FISA Court Amicus Should Be Able to Ignore Its 
Congressionally Imposed Duty, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 539, 549–50 (2016). 
 153. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1154 (alteration in original) (quoting Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982)). 
 154. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 156. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176. 
 157. Id. at 179. 
 158. Soree, supra note 25, at 570. 
 159. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see Soree, supra note 25, at 582–83.  
This concept dates back to the early 1900s and the Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler 
v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900), in which the Court noted that 
a plaintiff is “bound to show an interest in the suit personal to himself.”  Id. at 406. 
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behalf of others under certain circumstances.160  Various courts have 
recognized that both state and private actors, in addition to 
traditional voluntary membership organizations, can assert the rights 
of others in the court.161  Yet the courts apply a more exacting 
standard for establishing standing when a third-party, rather than an 
individual, seeks to assert individual rights.162 
1. Powers v. Ohio test for individual third-party standing 
The Supreme Court in Powers v. Ohio explained when a third-party 
individual may raise a vicarious claim on behalf of an injured party.  
In that case, a criminal defendant was able to challenge his own 
conviction by raising an Equal Protection claim on behalf of a juror 
who had been excluded from the trial on the basis of his race in a 
peremptory challenge by the prosecutor.163  The Court emphasized 
that the “discriminatory use of peremptory challenges” results in a 
direct harm to a criminal defendant, and the defendant has a 
legitimate interest in challenging the practice.164  It reasoned that the 
criminal defendant and juror are sufficiently closely related such that 
the criminal defendant would be a worthy advocate on behalf of the 
juror.165  Moreover, the Court recognized that even though jurors 
                                                     
 160. See, e.g., Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 
F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (permitting a non-profit organization to file suit on behalf 
of its terminally ill members, challenging a provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
that made it difficult for terminally ill patients to access experimental drugs). 
 161. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988) 
(permitting a bookstore to preemptively raise a First Amendment claim on behalf of 
booksellers); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977) 
(holding that a state agency had standing to raise a claim on behalf of Washington 
apple growers and dealers); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194–95 (1976) 
(authorizing a beer vendor to assert an Equal Protection claim for males not allowed 
to purchase beer prior to turning twenty-one); In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 
F. Supp. 2d 244, 258 (D.D.C. 2003) (clarifying that Verizon was “an adequate 
advocate to assert the First Amendment rights of its subscribers”), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 
351 F.3d 1229, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 162. See cases cited supra note 161 (applying more specific standards for establishing 
third-party standing, such as an “actual and well-founded fear” that a law will be 
enforced against a plaintiff, a “financial nexus” between the interests of the third party 
and its constituents, third-party standing, and First Amendment chilling effect). 
 163. 499 U.S. 400, 403, 411 (1991) (noting that standing has been permitted in the 
criminal context where defendants challenge their convictions by asserting the rights of 
third parties or where raising a third party’s rights would prevent future prosecution). 
 164. Id. at 411. 
 165. Id. at 413. 
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excluded on the basis of race do have the ability to bring a lawsuit on 
their own behalf,166 such challenges are unlikely.167 
The Powers Court went on to articulate the following third-party 
standing test: 
The litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him 
or her a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue 
in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; 
and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to 
protect his or her own interests.168 
Almost all applications of the Powers test have been in the context 
of criminal justice or immigration law169 and have not involved a 
company or organization bringing a constitutional challenge on 
behalf of its clients or members. 
2. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission test for 
organizational third-party standing 
To assert standing as a third-party organization, the party must show 
a significant personal stake in the outcome of a claim to justify finding 
jurisdiction in a federal court.170  For example, in Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission,171  Washington State apple growers 
challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina Board of 
Agriculture regulation requiring all apples shipped into North 
Carolina to display the USDA grade or nothing.172  Because the 
Washington State apple growers’ standards were higher than the 
USDA standards, the Washington State apple growers were at a 
disadvantage in North Carolina.173  The Supreme Court held that the 
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission had standing to 
challenge the regulation because (1) the growers could not use their 
pre-printed packages displaying the apple type and Washington grade 
                                                     
 166. Id. at 414 (citing Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 329–30 
(1970)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 411 (citations omitted). 
 169. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433 (1998) (holding that an 
illegitimate daughter had standing to bring an Equal Protection challenge to a 
statute governing the citizenship of illegitimate children on behalf of her citizen 
father); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1125 (11th Cir. 1994) (ruling that a 
prison inmate was unable to assert a guards’ First Amendment rights to speak with 
the parole board). 
 170. Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982)). 
 171. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
 172. Id. at 336–37. 
 173. Id. 
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without forgoing the ability to sell Washington apples in North 
Carolina, (2) it was the Commission’s job to “protect[] and enhanc[e] 
the market for Washington apples,” and (3) an interstate commerce 
claim does not require the participation of the growers themselves.174 
The three-part standing test that the Supreme Court articulated in 
Hunt is as follows:  (1) at least one member of the organization must 
satisfy the requirements for individual standing; (2) the interests that 
the organization seeks to protect must be related to the 
organization’s purpose; and (3) the claim cannot require that an 
individual member of the organization participate in the lawsuit, 
meaning no single injured party can be the lynchpin of the cause of 
action.175  Unlike the Powers test, the Hunt test does not consider 
whether the individuals in the organization have the ability to raise a 
claim and protect their rights themselves, but instead, it prohibits 
standing where the claim and recovery would require individual 
participation in the lawsuit.176 
Although the Hunt test has traditionally applied to organizations with 
a member-like constituency,177 the purpose of this test is to ensure that 
the organization can adequately represent and protect the interests of 
any harmed constituents.178  One strong indicator of a sufficient 
relationship to confer standing is whether the outcome of the litigation 
could negatively affect the interests of the organization.179 
Even though courts have not always expressly invoked the Hunt test 
to determine a party’s standing, they have applied similar principles 
and justifications to confer standing on corporations.180  For example, 
                                                     
 174. Id. at 343–44. 
 175. Id. at 342–43 (“So long as . . . the relief sought does not make the individual 
participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, 
the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to 
invoke the court’s jurisdiction.”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 
(1975)); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown 
Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (elucidating that the first two prongs are 
constitutional requirements for standing and the third prong is a judicially-created 
prudential limitation); Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(reciting the same three-part test). 
 176. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. 
 177. Id. at 344–45 (noting that “indicia of membership in an organization,” like 
electing members of the board or commission and financing its activities, are enough 
to establish a sufficient relationship between parties to confer standing). 
 178. See id. at 345 (concluding that the Commission represented, protected, and 
expressed the views of the state’s apple growers). 
 179. See id. (noting a “financial nexus” between the Commission and its constituents). 
 180. See, e.g., supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to 
confer standing on the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission because the 
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in In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,181 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia applied a similar rationale in concluding that 
Verizon had standing to bring a First Amendment challenge to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act on behalf of its Internet 
subscribers.182  The court determined that the relationship between 
Verizon and its customers was such that Verizon would be able to 
adequately raise “concrete and sharply presented” customer 
grievances.183  The court went on to recognize that Verizon had a 
significant interest in the litigation because a failure to protect its 
customers’ rights could “affect Verizon’s ability to maintain and 
broaden its client base.”184 
B. Raising a Fourth Amendment Claim as a Third Party 
The Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment violation 
cannot be raised vicariously because it is strictly an individual right.185  
Accordingly, only an individual whose Fourth Amendment rights have 
been allegedly violated can make a claim for relief upon those rights.186 
III. MICROSOFT INCORRECTLY RELIES ON THE POWERS TEST TO 
ESTABLISH STANDING AND SHOULD HAVE INSTEAD RELIED ON THE 
HUNT TEST 
“[T]he defense of privacy follows, and never precedes, the emergence of new 
technologies for the exposure of secrets . . . .  [T]he case for privacy always 
comes too late.” 
—Jill Lepore187 
                                                     
Commission was responsible for protecting apple growers and its claim did not 
require their participation). 
 181. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Recording 
Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1239 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). 
 182. Id. at 257–58. 
 183. Id. at 258. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quoting Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969))); accord Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 
204, 219 (1981) (“[R]ights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are 
personal in nature . . . .”), reh’g granted, 664 F.2d 1241 (1981). 
 186. Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998); 
see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 (“A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search . . . of a 
third person[] . . . has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”). 
 187. The Prism, NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazin 
e/2013/06/24/the-prism. 
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A. Microsoft Incorrectly Relies on Powers v. Ohio to Assert Its Standing to 
Raise a Fourth Amendment Claim on Behalf of Its Customers 
Microsoft improperly relies upon the Powers test under third-party 
current standing doctrine for individuals to assert its standing to 
bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to the SCA on behalf of its 
customers and should have instead relied upon the test articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Hunt regarding organizational standing.  
Neither party addresses the Hunt case in their briefs before the 
court.188  Despite the lack of discussion about the Hunt case and the 
government’s failure to refute Microsoft’s reliance on Powers, it is 
unclear whether Microsoft has standing to bring its Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the SCA because the court may raise 
standing issues sua sponte.189 
Microsoft applied the Powers test and argued (1) that the 
government’s actions have damaged the company’s business interest 
in protecting its customers’ privacy and maintaining customer trust,190 
(2) that the relationship between a service provider and its customers 
is sufficiently close to justify raising a vicarious claim under Powers,191 
and (3) that Microsoft’s customers are not able to assert their own 
interests because they are unaware that a search or seizure of their 
data has occurred due to the nature of the government’s actions 
under sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA.192  Microsoft’s argument is 
compelling, particularly concerning its customers’ inability to raise 
                                                     
 188. See generally Am. Compl., supra note 14; Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 54; 
Microsoft’s Opposition to Government’s Motion to Dismiss, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR, 2016 WL 4734703 (W.D. Wash. filed Aug. 26, 
2016) [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n]. 
 189. Because standing relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and the overall 
justiciability of a case, a court may raise such issues sua sponte without full briefings from 
the parties.  Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God:  A Critical Look at Sua Sponte 
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002). 
 190. Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 39. 
 191. Id. (citing In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258 (D.D.C. 
2003)) (“Verizon’s relationship with its client subscribers is the kind of relationship 
that warrants allowing Verizon to assert a First Amendment challenge on their 
behalf.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.  Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. 
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 192. Id.; cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) (denying 
respondents’ argument that the nature of FISA wiretaps would fail to provide notice 
to the targets of the search because if the government decides to use the information 
from a search, it must notify the affected person first). 
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their own Fourth Amendment challenges; however, the company has 
applied the wrong test.193 
Microsoft’s attempt to assert its customers’ Fourth Amendment 
rights vicariously in its challenge to the SCA is not even remotely 
analogous to Powers.  In Powers, a criminal defendant challenged his 
own conviction by raising an Equal Protection claim on behalf of one 
of the jurors excluded from the trial on the basis of race.194  Courts 
have applied the Powers test primarily in the criminal law and 
immigration contexts,195 not to corporations or other companies 
bringing a constitutional challenge on behalf of their customers.  
Furthermore, the harm required of a Powers plaintiff is much more 
significant than that required under Hunt—the criminal defendant in 
Powers had a personal stake in his own liberty.  While courts have 
found that corporations do have an interest in customer retention,196 
courts place an exceedingly high value on a criminal defendant’s 
ability to challenge his conviction by raising the rights of others.197 
Microsoft should instead have relied upon the test articulated in 
Hunt to establish standing of a third-party organization.198  Microsoft’s 
position as a cloud service provider in a business-customer 
                                                     
 193. In its response, Microsoft suggests that the government has conceded that 
Powers is the controlling framework to determine standing.  See Pl.’s Opp’n, supra 
note 188, at 17.  However, because standing goes to subject matter jurisdiction, a 
court may address the issue sua sponte. 
 194. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–12 (1991). 
 195. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (holding that an illegitimate 
daughter had standing to bring an Equal Protection challenge to a statute governing 
the citizenship of illegitimate children on behalf of her citizen father); Harris v. 
Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1125 (11th Cir. 1994) (ruling that a prison inmate was 
unable to assert a guard’s First Amendment rights to speak with the parole board). 
 196. See, e.g., In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (recognizing that “Verizon has a 
vested interest in vigorously protecting [the rights of its customers] because a failure 
to do so could affect Verizon’s ability to maintain and broaden its client base”), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet 
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 197. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (“Petitioner has much at stake in proving that his 
jury was improperly constituted due to an [E]qual [P]rotection violation, for we have 
recognized that discrimination in the jury selection process may lead to the reversal 
of a conviction.”).  In its filings, Microsoft indicated that its “customer trust” has been 
harmed, but it did not provide any evidence suggesting that it has actually lost 
customers as a result.  See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 39; Pl.’s Opp’n, supra 
note 188, at 17–18.  The Court has repeatedly found that criminal defendants may 
raise the rights of third parties in challenging their own convictions.  See, e.g., 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443–46 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 481 (1965); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429–30 (1961). 
 198. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1977); 
supra note 175 and accompanying text (articulating the Hunt three-part test). 
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relationship is analogous to that of an organization’s relationship 
with its voluntary members because this relationship implies that the 
business has the ability to adequately represent the interests of the 
harmed customers sufficient to justify conferring standing.199  
Specifically, Microsoft has an important business interest at stake in 
the litigation because a decision upholding the constitutionality of 
sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA stands to threaten customer 
confidence in and reliance on Microsoft’s cloud-storage solutions,200 
thereby damaging its ability to attract and retain customers. This 
“privacy” or “security” nexus is similar to the “financial nexus” 
between the third-party organization and its constituents in Hunt.201  
Because Microsoft stands to lose business on account of the 
government’s use of secrecy orders in conjunction with no-notice 
warrants, Microsoft has the motivation and ability to serve as a zealous 
advocate of its customers’ rights; therefore, the Hunt test—as it 
applies to third-party organizations and other similar entities—is 
appropriate for Microsoft Corp.  Under the Hunt test, however, 
Microsoft’s standing argument still likely fails. 
B. Microsoft Likely Does Not Have Standing Under the Current Hunt Test 
1. Microsoft likely fails to satisfy the first prong of the Hunt test 
The Hunt test requires that at least one member of the 
organization must have standing to sue in his or her own right.202  
While there is conclusive evidence in Microsoft Corp. that the 
government’s actions constituted a search—thus implicating the 
Fourth Amendment203—there is no evidence in the record before the 
court that would suggest a Microsoft customer has suffered a 
sufficient injury in fact as a result of the search to confer standing to 
                                                     
 199. See In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (citing Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988)); Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 
(1990); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194–97 (1976)). 
 200. See Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 5.  For a discussion about the negative 
impact of the government’s use of secrecy orders on Microsoft’s cloud storage 
business, see supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. 
 201. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345. 
 202. Id. at 343. 
 203. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(explaining that Fourth Amendment violations require a showing of an actual 
expectation of privacy and that the expectation is one held by society to be 
reasonable). 
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raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to sections 2703 and 2705 of 
the SCA.204 
a. The government’s actions under sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA 
constitute a search implicating the Fourth Amendment 
Before addressing whether a Microsoft customer has standing to sue 
in his own right, the Fourth Amendment standing doctrine mandates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry to determine whether the 
legal question implicates the Fourth Amendment.205  This requires 
determining (1) whether Microsoft’s customers had a subjectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications stored on the 
cloud and (2) whether society as a whole recognizes their subjective 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.206 
Microsoft’s customers likely did have a subjective expectation of 
privacy, and society is likely ready to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable.  Most Americans believe email and other stored 
communications and documents should be protected in the same 
fashion as phone calls and snail mail letters.207  On the other hand, 
email has never been an entirely secure method of communication 
with emails stored on the sender’s computer, on the Internet service 
provider’s cloud service, and on the recipient’s computer,208 thereby 
diminishing the expectation of privacy for emails.  The expectation of 
privacy has also evolved with technological developments.  As Justice 
Murphy noted more than seventy years ago, “the search of one’s 
home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has 
brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person’s 
privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which 
were detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth 
Amendment.”209  Determining what constitutes a privacy invasion is 
not straightforward, and popular attitudes about privacy inevitably 
                                                     
 204. See generally Am. Compl., supra note 14; Pl.’s Opp’n, supra note 188. 
 205. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 206. See id.  As an alternative to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, Jim Harper 
of the Cato Institute would engage in a factual inquiry to determine whether “the 
individual claiming Fourth Amendment protection actually [had] privacy.”  Jim Harper, 
Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1398 (2008). 
 207. See Benson, supra note 40.  But see Melissa Medina, Note, The Stored 
Communications Act:  An Old Statute for Modern Times, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 268 (2013) 
(noting that Google’s assertion that its email subscribers did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in its communications was consistent with well-established law). 
 208. Email Privacy Concerns, FINDLAW, http://files.findlaw.com/pdf/consumer/consu 
mer.findlaw.com_online-scams_email-privacy-concerns.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 209. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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shift as the boundaries between home, office, and public space 
continue to gray.210  Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that Microsoft’s customers expected that their emails were 
conversations kept between themselves and their recipients;211 
moreover, society would recognize that expectation as reasonable 
given the major shift in access to similar technologies. 
b. Microsoft’s customers likely have not suffered a sufficient injury in 
fact to raise a claim themselves 
To establish standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim post-
Spokeo, a Microsoft customer must identify a harm that is both 
concrete and particularized.  In this case involving government 
investigations,212 he or she would likely need to show that the 
disclosure of cloud-based personal information to the government 
under sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA resulted in an indictment, 
criminal proceedings, denial of immigration benefits, or another 
significant harm.213  After Spokeo, the sharing of personal data and 
information does not immediately result in an injury in fact sufficient 
to confer standing; the sharing of personal data and information only 
satisfies the particularized, personal harm requirement.214  A plaintiff 
could not show a concrete harm until the disclosed information was 
used in a negative or harmful way against the individual.215 
The facts alleged in the record before the court do not suggest that 
the government’s use of no-notice warrants and secrecy orders under 
sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA have led to any of Microsoft’s 
customers being subject to legal proceedings related to the 
information that the government obtained through the search or 
seizure.216  It is possible that a Microsoft customer may be in such a 
                                                     
 210. See supra notes 125–32 and accompanying text. 
 211. Kerr, supra note 32, at 1209 (noting that an Internet user may consider online 
storage space as a “virtual home” that receives Fourth Amendment protections). 
 212. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–50 (2016); see also Attias v. 
CareFirst, Inc., No. 15-cv-00882, slip op. at 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2016); Soree, 
supra note 25, at 570–71; supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text; supra notes 137–
41 and accompanying text (explaining that chances are high that Spokeo will be the 
most significant for cases involving procedural rights). 
 214. For a discussion on the difference between a concrete harm and a 
particularized harm, see supra note 84. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See generally Am. Compl., supra note 14.  This is also similar to California 
Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), in which the Court denied standing 
to bank customers who could not show that information about their personal 
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position, especially considering that emails are a common form of 
evidence used in “commercial litigation and white-collar criminal 
cases.”217  However, given that Microsoft has the burden of 
demonstrating its standing to sue, this hypothetical situation is not 
sufficient to meet the requirement that at least one Microsoft 
customer have standing to sue in his own right.218 
2. Microsoft fulfills the requirements of the second prong of the Hunt test 
The Hunt test as applied to corporations would also require that 
the corporation’s interest in litigating a claim be related to the 
subject matter in which the corporation has relevant experience or 
expertise.219  In seeking to protect its customers’ Fourth Amendment 
rights, Microsoft claims that it improves trust among its customers as 
a cloud storage provider.220  As reliance on digital technology in 
business has increased, companies that do not prioritize the security 
of their customers’ personal data have lost “customers’ goodwill—and 
their business.”221  Moreover, while merely asserting its customers’ 
Fourth Amendment rights will likely increase customer faith in 
Microsoft, it does nothing to increase confidence in the cloud as a 
service.  Absent a successful lawsuit, Microsoft argues that the 
government’s continued practices under sections 2703 and 2705 of 
the SCA have the potential to reduce confidence in the cloud as a 
whole, thereby potentially reducing its cloud customer base. 
It is unclear whether the “germane to its purpose” prong would 
require that Microsoft have a demonstrated long-standing interest in 
protecting customer privacy to establish standing.  It could be argued 
that Microsoft has only recently taken an interest in its customers’ 
data privacy and has struggled to establish and maintain customer 
trust over the years.222  However, Microsoft has recently taken a 
                                                     
financial transactions had been reported under the Treasury Department 
regulations.  Id. at 67–68. 
 217. See Jason Knott, Email and the Business Records Exception, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 
(Sept. 25, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialpractice/ 
articles/summer2013-0913-email-and-business-records-exception.html. 
 218. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
 219. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1977). 
 220. Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 39. 
 221. Morey et al., supra note 13. 
 222. See, e.g., Tom Warren, EFF Blasts Microsoft over Windows 10 Privacy Concerns, 
VERGE (Aug. 22, 2016, 7:18 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/22/12582622/e 
ff-microsoft-windows-10-privacy-concerns (noting that “Windows 10 sends an 
unprecedented amount of usage data back to Microsoft” and that there is a clear 
“trust issue”). 
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hardline approach to improving customer trust and ensuring its 
customers’ privacy, and it established the “Microsoft Trust Center” to 
emphasize its dedication to security.223  Even if there is a lack of 
historical dedication to privacy, Microsoft has transformed itself into 
a company that is incredibly devoted to protecting customer privacy, 
likely satisfying the requirement that Microsoft’s interest in the 
litigation be essential to its operation as a cloud service provider. 
3. Microsoft fails to satisfy the third prong of the Hunt test 
The Hunt test also provides that a claim must be able to proceed 
without individual participation in the lawsuit.224  Because Rakas held 
that a Fourth Amendment claim may not be raised vicariously by 
anyone aside from the individual whose rights were violated225 a 
Microsoft customer whose data has been accessed by the government 
under sections 2703 and 2705(b) likely must participate in the 
lawsuit.  Moreover, because Microsoft cannot satisfy the first prong of 
the Hunt test absent facts demonstrating that a Microsoft customer 
has suffered a sufficient injury in fact,226 Microsoft’s lawsuit would 
require proof that an individual Microsoft customer has faced a 
negative impact as a result of the government search. 
Microsoft relies heavily on In re Verizon Internet Services to suggest 
that the company has standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim 
on behalf of its customers.227  However, while In re Verizon Internet 
Services serves as an example of a corporation having standing on 
behalf of its customers,228 the context of the law suit makes a 
significant difference.  In In re Verizon Internet Services, the D.C. District 
Court found that Verizon had standing to bring a First Amendment 
challenge on behalf of its customers.229  Notably, courts are more 
likely to strictly adhere to the “prudential limitations on standing” in 
                                                     
 223. See, e.g., Microsoft Trust Center, Responding to Government and Law Enforcement 
Requests to Access Customer Data, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/TrustCenter/Priva 
cy/Responding-to-govt-agency-requests-for-customer-data (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); 
Why Businesses Can Trust Office 365 with Their Data, BIZTECH (Aug. 18, 2016), 
http://www.biztechmagazine.com/article/2016/08/why-businesses-can-trust-office-
365-their-data (noting Microsoft’s additional efforts to enhance consumer trust 
through a prioritization of security and collaboration with third-party software). 
 224. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342–43. 
 225. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978). 
 226. Supra Section III.B.1.b. 
 227. Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 39. 
 228. Supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 229. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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Fourth Amendment cases than in First Amendment cases;230 
therefore, In re Verizon Internet Services is likely not controlling. 
C. Justice Requires the Adoption of a New Relaxed Hunt Test to Determine 
General Third-Party Standing Under the Fourth Amendment 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Spokeo, the Court should 
firmly establish the unauthorized disclosure of personal data and 
information as a search implicating the Fourth Amendment and as a 
harm that is both concrete and particularized.231  Otherwise, 
individuals who have been the subject of a government investigation 
will find themselves unable to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge 
until after the information has been disclosed, subjecting them to an 
even greater harm. 
 Moreover, the Court should depart from its long-held policy that a 
Fourth Amendment claim cannot be raised vicariously. Otherwise, 
outdated and inadequate standing doctrines will prevent challenges 
over whether existing statutes should apply to new forms of private 
information—including third-party electronic communications—that 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.  To combat these issues, the Court 
should blend the Hunt and Powers tests and adopt the following test for 
third-party Fourth Amendment standing:  (1) the individual whose 
rights are being asserted has suffered an invasion of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, thereby establishing an injury in fact; (2) the 
third party has an interest in the litigation related to its area of 
expertise; and (3) the individual is unable to assert his or her own 
rights.  The first two prongs of the Hunt test ensure that the third party 
can adequately represent the individual’s interests, and the last prong 
of the Powers test prioritizes the inability of the individual to protect his 
or her own interest by raising his or her own claim.232 
                                                     
 230. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) (quoting Sec’y of State of Md. v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 956 (1984)). 
 231. If the Court does not determine that the disclosure of personal data is a 
concrete and actual harm, satisfying the Spokeo requirement, there will be long-term 
implications every time there is a search without subsequent litigation.  See supra 
notes 73–79 and accompanying text.  By committing to the basic Fourth Amendment 
standing requirement—that there be a search or seizure—the Court provides 
increased protection for individuals subjected to government investigation. 
 232. This is not the first time that the Court has been called upon to change its 
standing requirements as applied to third parties.  For example, in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), Justice Blackmun called for “an imaginative expansion 
of our traditional concepts of standing in order to enable an organization such as the 
Sierra Club, possessed, as it is, of pertinent, bona fide and well-recognized attributes 
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1. Microsoft would have standing under the new hybrid test for Fourth 
Amendment standing 
 When there is no notice of a search or seizure to Microsoft’s cloud 
customers, and Microsoft, as the cloud service provider, cannot 
communicate with its customers about the search or seizure, there is a 
big problem.  Exacerbating this problem is the fact that Microsoft 
customers, and therefore Microsoft, likely lack standing to challenge the 
government’s practice under the SCA.  However, if the Court were to 
limit the impact of Spokeo and adopt a hybrid standing test to emphasize 
the inability of an individual to assert their own rights, Microsoft would 
likely prevail and vindicate its customers’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
a. Microsoft would likely satisfy the first prong of the hybrid standing 
test 
If the Court were to reject extending the Spokeo decision to Fourth 
Amendment standing, Microsoft customers would clearly have 
suffered an injury in fact because a search of the customers’ personal 
information has clearly occurred.233  In Clapper, the Supreme Court 
controversially noted that standing is not justified for an individual or 
group just because the constitutionality of a statute may not otherwise 
be challenged.234  Clapper is distinguishable from Microsoft Corp., 
however, because the respondents in Clapper relied on hypothetical 
future harm from wiretap surveillance235 whereas Microsoft Corp. raises 
a Fourth Amendment claim related to a harm that has already 
occurred:  the disclosure of Microsoft’s customers’ data to the 
government.236  Moreover, because the individuals affected by the 
government’s searches or seizures are not aware that their cloud-
stored communications have been accessed, Microsoft is the only 
party that has the knowledge to bring such a lawsuit. 
Microsoft has also recognized that there should be exceptions to 
their argument,237 but the fact that the government’s practices under 
                                                     
and purposes in the area of the environment, to litigate environmental issues.”  Id. at 
757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 233. See supra Section III.B.1.a. 
 234. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–49 (2013). 
 235. Supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 236. Am. Compl., supra note 14, at para. 5. 
 237. For example, the company allows that a lengthy or indeterminate bar is 
justified in the name of national security.  Supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
This argument provides additional problems for Microsoft’s lawsuit because in 
recognizing that there are exceptions, Microsoft may lose its facial challenge to the 
SCA.  That discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA cannot otherwise be challenged, 
even when they pertain to searches that do not implicate national 
security concerns, should make the Court uneasy.  Individuals cannot 
be without a forum to challenge these government practices. 
b. Microsoft would likely satisfy the second prong of the hybrid standing 
test 
As discussed, Microsoft’s position as a cloud-service provider 
satisfies the requirement that Microsoft’s interest in litigating its 
customer’s privacy interests relate to information stored on 
Microsoft’s cloud platform.238  Microsoft can adequately represent its 
customers’ privacy interests because increased customer trust will 
likely strengthen Microsoft’s business as a cloud service provider.239  
Conversely, Microsoft argues, if it cannot assert its customers’ Fourth 
Amendment rights, the company stands to lose cloud customers.240 
c. Microsoft would likely satisfy the third prong of the hybrid standing 
test 
Despite the poor fit between the Powers test and its argument to 
show standing,241 Microsoft likely relied on the test because of its last 
prong that protects individuals who are either unable or unlikely to 
assert their own rights.242  Microsoft might have hoped to appeal to 
the Court’s desire to permit an individual to have his or her day in 
court because Microsoft’s customers are, in fact, unable to assert their 
own Fourth Amendment rights.  The government’s practice of 
combining no-notice warrants and secrecy orders under sections 2703 
and 2705 of the SCA leave these customers unaware that the 
government has accessed their personal information and 
communications stored on the cloud.243  This proposed framework 
would better protect individual rights because it would permit third-
                                                     
Clapper, in which the Court permitted the NSA to conduct wiretap searches to gain 
additional intelligence for national security purposes, provides an example of this 
national security exception in the FISA context.  Supra notes 153–58 and 
accompanying text; see also Standing—Challenges to Government Surveillance—Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, 127 HARV. L. REV. 298, 298 (2013) (suggesting that the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Clapper should only apply in limited 
circumstances—in the case of “foreign affairs or national security”). 
 238. See supra Section III.B.2. 
 239. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 190–97. 
 242. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). 
 243. Supra notes 48–51and accompanying text. 
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party standing when an organization or corporation such as Microsoft 
raises a Fourth Amendment challenge on behalf of its customers who 
are unable to do so on their own.244 
2. Enacting the Email Privacy Act amendment to the SCA would not 
diminish the need for an updated Fourth Amendment standing doctrine 
Congress is currently contemplating a significant change to the 
SCA—the Email Privacy Act—that would eliminate the specific 
substantive problems raised by the Microsoft Corp. lawsuit.245  The 
proposed amendment requires that any secrecy order issued under 
section 2705 of the SCA (1) be limited to a maximum of 180 days and 
(2) make a showing that notifying the individual of the search would 
have an “adverse result.”246  In other words, if this bill becomes law, the 
government would not be able to use indefinite secrecy orders, absent 
extenuating circumstances.  Moreover, this amendment would require 
the government to obtain a warrant in all circumstances, not just when 
communications have been stored for fewer than 180 days.247 
The Email Privacy Act amendment to the SCA was approved 
unanimously by the House Judiciary Committee248 and passed the full 
House on April 27, 2016, with incredible support.249  Equivalent 
legislation considered in the Senate also had support,250 but it did not 
pass.251  Congressmen Jared Polis (D-Colo.) and Kevin Yoder (R-Kan.) 
reintroduced the bill on January 9, 2017, with new urgency:  while the 
                                                     
 244. See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion of the Powers test and Section II.A.2 
for a discussion of the Hunt test. 
 245. Daskal, supra note 41.  Members of Congress have introduced a version of 
this ECPA reform bill every year since 2012.  Kevin Collier, Amid Fears of Trump 
Cabinet, Congress Revives Email Privacy Bill, VOCATIV (Jan. 12, 2017, 9:35 AM), 
http://www.vocativ.com/391324/amid-fears-of-trump-cabinet-congress-revives-email-
privacy-bill. 
 246. Daskal, supra note 41. 
 247. Summary:  H.R. 699:  Email Privacy Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/114/hr699/summary (last updated Feb. 24, 2016). 
 248. Dustin Volz, Long-Stalled Email Privacy Bill Advances in Congress, REUTERS (Apr. 
13, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-emails-idUSKCN0XA1VK. 
 249. See Summary:  H.R. 699:  Email Privacy Act, supra note 247.  The Email Privacy 
Act “[a]mends the [ECPA] to prohibit a provider of remote computing service or 
electronic communication service to the public from knowingly divulging to a 
governmental entity the contents of any communication that is in electronic storage 
or otherwise maintained by the provider, subject to exceptions,” and would also 
require notice of a warrant within three to ten days to the subject of the search.  
Summary:  H.R. 699 – 114th Congress (2015–2016), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/699 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 250. Volz, supra note 248. 
 251. Collier, supra note 245. 
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loophole in ECPA permitting the government to circumvent the 
warrant requirement has not often been used, President Donald 
Trump’s cabinet, particularly Attorney General Jeff Sessions, is 
suspected to be more “hostile to civil liberties.”252 
Microsoft Corp. will likely take years to make its way through the court 
system,253 so the passing of the Email Privacy Act could make the 
substantive issues at the heart of the case moot.  However, as reliance on 
third-party technologies increases, it is likely that a similar standing 
problem will arise again.  For example, what if the government tried to 
access non-communicative, substantive business documents stored on 
the cloud?  This information would not be governed by the ECPA or the 
SCA, and the Email Privacy Act amendment would not apply.  There is 
still a significant need for more clarity on the Fourth Amendment 
standing doctrine as it applies to third parties. 
For a third-party plaintiff to establish standing for a Fourth 
Amendment claim, the Court should allow a plaintiff to show a harm 
sufficient to confer standing by pleading either (1) a search or 
seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment or (2) a lack of notice 
of a search or seizure.  The Court should also emphasize the ability 
(or inability) of an individual to assert their own rights when 
determining whether third-party standing is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
A court will likely determine that Microsoft lacks standing to bring 
a Fourth Amendment challenge to sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA 
because Microsoft’s customers themselves lack standing.  Microsoft 
improperly relied upon the Powers test to establish third-party standing 
to raise a Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of its customers because 
the Hunt test for organizational standing is more appropriate for 
Microsoft’s business/customer relationship.  Microsoft has a stake in the 
outcome of the lawsuit because it stands to lose cloud customers if the 
SCA is upheld as constitutional; therefore, the company should be able 
to act as an adequate advocate for its customer’s rights. 
The government’s simultaneous exercise of SCA sections 2703 and 
2705—issuing no-notice warrants and indefinite secrecy orders—
prevents a cloud customer from receiving notice that a search or 
seizure of their communications has taken place.  Yet, Microsoft likely 
does not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim because 
Microsoft cannot satisfy the current third-party standing test under 
                                                     
 252. Id. (quoting Julian Sanchez of the Cato Institute). 
 253. Kerstetter, supra note 23. 
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Hunt that requires the participation of a harmed Microsoft customer.  
Furthermore, unless the Court declines to extend the Spokeo holding 
to the Fourth Amendment, a Microsoft customer may not have 
suffered the requisite injury in fact because the invasion of privacy is 
particularized but not necessarily concrete:  Microsoft’s customers 
likely satisfy the reasonable expectation of privacy test—indicating a 
Fourth Amendment search and potential Fourth Amendment 
violation—but there is no evidence that they have suffered any 
further negative impact from the search, and they may be left without 
an avenue to challenge the constitutionality of the search. 
Microsoft Corp. helps to illustrate the problems with a narrow Fourth 
Amendment standing doctrine.  A more flexible hybrid test for third-
party Fourth Amendment standing, reflecting portions of both the 
Hunt and Powers tests, is necessary to ensure that individuals’ data and 
information is protected as technologies continue to develop. 
